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Abstract
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games
àl aH o t e l l i n ga r ea ﬀected when ﬁrms acquire inputs through bi-
lateral monopoly relations with suppliers. Assuming a duopoly
downstream market, we consider the case of two independent in-
put suppliers bargaining with both downstream ﬁrms. We ﬁnd
that the presence of input suppliers changes the locational in-
centives of downstream ﬁrms in several ways, compared with the
case of exogenous production costs. Bargaining induces down-
stream ﬁrms to locate further apart, despite the fact that input
prices increase with the distance between the ﬁrms. In the case
of asymmetrical bargaining strengths, the downstream ﬁrm fac-
ing the stronger input supplier has a strategic advantage and lo-
cates closer to the market centre. Sequential location introduces
a ﬁrst-mover advantage which may be mitigated or reinforced,
depending on whether or not it is the ﬁrst mover that bargains
with the stronger input supplier.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In most models of endogenous location, interpreted either in geograph-
ical space or product space, ﬁrms are assumed to base their choice of
location on a trade-oﬀ between capturing a larger share of the market
and avoiding more intense competition. The former consideration would
induce ﬁrms to locate close to each other, whereas the latter would point
in the direction of the opposite. In the present paper we analyse a situ-
ation in which locational choice also aﬀects ﬁrms’ production costs. We
do so by modelling a duopoly in which downstream ﬁrms acquire inputs
through bilateral monopoly relations with upstream input suppliers. In-
put prices are determined in simultaneous bargaining between each ﬁrm
and its input supplier.
Such bilateral monopoly relations are an important feature of sev-
eral industries (see e.g. Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). The most obvious
example is probably that of a ﬁrm with a unionised labour force, where
wages are determined in bargaining between the ﬁrm and its trade union.
When analysing the location choices of downstream ﬁr m si nt h i st y p eo f
industry structure, we make the important assumption that production
technologies are independent of locations in the downstream market.
This essentially means that for a given technology, which locks a down-
stream ﬁrm into a bilateral monopoly relation with an upstream input
supplier, each downstream ﬁrm has a feasible (non-empty) strategy space
in terms of location, implying that the same input can be used at diﬀer-
ent locations. If location is interpreted in geographical space (e.g. the
’linear city’), the reasonableness of this assumption should be obvious,
and even if we think of location as horizontal product diﬀerentiation
it would be reasonable to assume that a given technology facilitates a
possibly large scope for diﬀerentiation. This assumption should be es-
pecially viable in the context of labour input with a certain degree of
general skills.1
The structural contents of the model resemble that of Horn and
Wolinsky (1988), who study the incentives for merger in such industries.
Our concern is quite diﬀerent, though, since we are interested in how
such bilateral monopoly relations aﬀect the downstream ﬁrms’ choice
of location. The crucial aspect of the model is the endogenisation of
production costs. Since diﬀerent locations will yield diﬀerent bargaining
1In the light of this discussion, standard models of location with exogenous and
constant marginal costs should be interpreted as implicitly relying on the same kind of
assumption about the independence between technology and location. Mayer (2000)
relaxes this assumption by allowing for production costs to vary (exogenously) across
locations. Assuming segmented markets and discriminatory pricing, this paper is
quite diﬀerent from ours, though.
2outcomes, the choice of location is not only governed by considerations
for market shares and the degree of inter-ﬁrm competition. Firms must
also take into account how their choice of location aﬀects production
costs.
Building on the classic work of Hotelling (1929), the ’standard’ model
of endogenous location is probably D’Aspremont et al. (1979). With uni-
formly distributed consumers and quadratic transportation costs they es-
tablished the ’Principle of Maximum Diﬀerentiation’: Firms will choose
to locate at the endpoints of the market. In subsequent years, vari-
ous attempts to challenge this result have resulted in a sizeable body
of theoretical work on this particular subject. The most common re-
search strategy has been to introduce stronger centripetal forces in the
model. This can be done in several ways. Neven (1986) and Tabuchi
and Thisse (1995) abolish the assumption of uniform distribution, and
assume that consumers are more concentrated around the market centre,
whereas Böckem (1994) and Rath and Zhao (2001) modify the model to
make demand elastic. Wang and Yang (1999) consider location choices
when the reservation price is binding (and identical for all consumers).
These modiﬁcations of the original model are all shown to yield loca-
tions ’inside the market’. By introducing R&D externalities between
the ﬁrms, Mai and Peng (1999) also get similar results. Economides
(1986) demonstrates that the principle of maximum diﬀerentiation does
not hold in general but only for suﬃciently convex transportation costs.
There exists a range of utility functions such that locations are interior
points of the market space. Friedman and Thisse (1993) show that if
ﬁrms collude on prices they will, in fact, locate at the market centre
as Hotelling initially predicted. To our knowledge, though, no attempt
has been made to analyse location choices with endogenous production
costs.2
Our purpose is not to challenge the Principle of Maximum Diﬀeren-
tiation. Rather, we want to analyse how bilateral monopoly relations
between upstream and downstream ﬁrms aﬀect the incentives for re-
location in the downstream market, compared with the case in which
downstream ﬁrms buy their inputs from a competitive upstream mar-
ket. In order to do so, we choose to apply the standard assumptions
of unit demand, uniformly distributed consumers and quadratic trans-
portation costs. Like Lambertini (1994, 1997) and Tabuchi and Thisse
(1995), and in contrast to D’Aspremont et al. (1979), we do not conﬁne
the ﬁrms to choose locations within the market space. This approach,
2One notable exception is Gupta et al. (1994), who analyse a location game in
which input prices are set by an upstream monopolist. However, using a model of
spatial price discrimination their approach is quite diﬀerent from ours.
3which is sometimes referred to as the ’unconstrained Hotelling model’,
allows us to avoid corner solutions. It is also a way to portray, albeit in
a rather crude way, a certain degree of consumer concentration in the
market, which seems to be a reasonable assumption, whether location is
measured in geographical space or product space.
Ap r i o r i , it is not obvious whether the endogenisation of production
costs turns out to be a centrifugal or centripetal force in the model. Since
input prices are increasing in the distance between downstream ﬁrms in
our model, one should perhaps think that the ﬁrms would locate closer in
order to lower production costs through increased competition between
the input suppliers. However, the model predicts the opposite result:
Input suppliers with positive bargaining power always cause the ﬁrms to
locate further apart. This apparently counter-intuitive result is due to
t h ef a c tt h a te n d o g e n i s a t i o no fp r o d u c t i o nc o s t sc h a n g e st h ed e g r e eo f
intensity in price competition between downstream ﬁrms as a response
to relocation. A relocation in the direction of the rival ﬁrm not only
reduces the input price for the ﬁrm relocating, but also for the rival
ﬁrm. This makes the centrifugal force of inter-ﬁrm competition even
stronger than in the case of exogenous production costs.
Analysing the case of asymmetric bargaining strength, we also ﬁnd
that bargaining with a strong upstream ﬁrm is a considerable strategic
advantage for downstream ﬁrms in the location game. The ﬁrm with
the stronger input supplier will always locate closer to the market than
its competitor.
We also extend the basic model by analysing the case in which ﬁrms
enter the market sequentially. In the case of exogenous production costs,
Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) ﬁnd that the ﬁrst entrant will locate in the
market centre, whereas the follower locates outside the market, reveal-
i n gas t r o n gﬁrst-mover advantage in the location game. Introducing
endogenous production costs, though, could alter the locational incen-
tives of the ﬁrst entrant quite considerably. We ﬁnd that, in the case
of asymmetric bargaining strength, the ﬁrst-mover advantage will be ei-
ther reinforced or mitigated, depending on which ﬁrm has the strategic
advantage of facing the stronger input supplier.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents
the basic model of simultaneous location choice with two independent
input suppliers. In section 3 we analyse how the locational incentives
of downstream ﬁrms are aﬀected by the endogenisation of production
costs, considering the cases of both symmetric and asymmetric bargain-
ing strength. In section 4 we extend the model to look at the case of
sequential location choice. In section 5, some of the welfare implications
of the model are considered, and, ﬁnally, some concluding remarks are
4oﬀered in section 6.
2M o d e l
There are two ﬁrms selling products 1 and 2 at prices p1 and p2, respec-
tively. The products diﬀer with respect to a one-dimensional charac-
teristic, measured by x ∈ R.W h e r e a sx in principle can take any real
value, we assume that consumer preferences are characterised by a vari-
able z ∈ [0,1],i m p l y i n gt h a tc o n s u m e rk h a sa’ m o s tp r e f e r r e dp r o d u c t ’ ,
given by zk. For simplicity, we assume that z is uniformly distributed
on [0,1], with unit mass.
Assuming unit demand, each consumer buys one unit of the good
from either of the ﬁrms. If consumer k buys the good from ﬁrm i,h e r
utility is given by
U
k





,i =1 ,2 (1)
The third term on the right hand side of (1) reﬂects the disutility asso-
ciated with buying a product that diﬀers from the consumer’s most pre-
ferred product. This ’transportation cost’ is assumed to be a quadratic
function of distance. Consumers maximise utility by choosing to buy the
good from the ﬁrm with the lower full price, i.e. mill price plus trans-
portation cost. The reservation price V , assumed to be equal across
consumers, is suﬃciently high for the market always to be covered.
Firms produce the good using an input factor l in a constant-returns-
to-scale technology, in which one unit of l produces one unit of output.
This technology is assumed to be independent of ﬁrms’ locations. Inputs
are supplied to the downstream ﬁrms by independent input suppliers,
with the input price wi being determined in bargaining between ﬁrm i
and its input supplier. The input suppliers’ marginal costs of production
are assumed to be equal, and are, without loss of generality, normalised
to zero. Both upstream and downstream ﬁrms are assumed to be proﬁt
maximisers. If we interpret the upstream ﬁrms as trade unions, this
would correspond to rent-maximising unions.
The proﬁt function of ﬁrm i is given by
πi =( pi − wi)Qi (2)
where Qi is the aggregate demand for ﬁrm i’s product. We can derive the
aggregate demand functions by using the following procedure: Assume,
without loss of generality, that x1 ≤ x2.W h e n ﬁrms are located at
x1 6= x2, let the location of the marginal consumer, who is indiﬀerent
between buying the good from either ﬁrm, be given by b z ∈ (0,1).F o r
this consumer the following equation must hold:
p1 + t(b z − x1)
2 = p2 + t(x2 − b z)
2







+ x1 + x2
¶
(3)
By the assumptions on the distribution of z, aggregate demand for ﬁrms








f (z)dz =1− b z (5)
where f (z) is the density function. Obviously, with uniform distribution
on (0,1) and unit mass, f (z)=1 .
Reasonably claiming location choice to be the long term decision of
the players, we propose the following sequence of moves in the game:
Stage 1: Firms simultaneously choose their locations, x1 and x2.
Stage 2: Input prices w1 and w2 are determined in simultaneous and
independent bargaining.
Stage 3: Output prices p1 and p2 are simultaneously set by the down-
stream ﬁrms.
As usual, the model is solved by backwards induction.
2.1 Stage 3: Price competition
Given the locations of the ﬁrms, x1 and x2, and the input prices, w1
and w2,t h eﬁrms simultaneously set prices to maximise proﬁts. The
ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm i is given by





=0 ,i =1 ,2 (6)




(2 + x1 + x2)(x2 − x1)+
1
3




(4 − x1 − x2)(x2 − x1)+
1
3
(2w2 + w1) (8)
62.2 Stage 2: Bargaining
We adopt the Nash bargaining model in a simultaneous bargaining set-
ting, where the players in each bargaining unit negotiate over the input
price assuming that an agreement will be reached within the other bar-
gaining unit. For simplicity, the threat points of the bargaining parties
are set equal to zero. The solution to the bargaining between ﬁrm i and
its input supplier is thus given by
wi =a r gm a x( wili)
αi π
1−αi
i ,i =1 ,2 (9)
where αi ∈ [0,1] is a measure of the relative bargaining strength of the
input supplier of ﬁrm i.
Using the anticipated equilibrium prices in the subsequent subgame,
(7)-(8), and imposing the technology li = Qi,w ec a ns o l v e( 9 )t oﬁnd
the equilibrium input prices:
w1 = α1t(x2 − x1)
·




w2 = α2t(x2 − x1)
·




2.3 Stage 1: Location choice
At the ﬁrst stage of the game, the downstream ﬁrms simultaneously
choose where to locate, each ﬁrm taking into account how its location
aﬀects input and output prices of both ﬁrms in subsequent stages of the
game. From (2), the ﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁrm i’s optimal choice













=0 ,i =1 ,2 (12)
In order to see how equilibrium locations depend on input prices, we
ﬁrst solve (12) for wi ﬁxed. Substituting from (3), (4)-(5) and (7)-(8)
into (12), letting
∂wi
∂xi =0 , and solving, yields
x1 = −




15t +4( w2 − w1)
12t
(14)
7Finally, using the equilibrium wages in (10)-(11), the equilibrium loca-
tions, as functions of relative bargaining strengths, are given by
x1 =




20 + 8α1 − 16α2 − α1α2
4(2− α1)(2− α2)
(16)
We are now equipped with the necessary expressions to analyse how
relocations aﬀect input prices, and conversely, how bargaining over input
prices aﬀect the ﬁrms’ incentives to relocate, compared with the case of
exogenous input prices. As a benchmark for comparison, consider the
following Lemma:
Lemma 1 If input prices are exogenous, and equal for both ﬁrms,
equilibrium locations are given by x1 = −1
4 and x2 = 5
4.
Proof. Setting w1 = w2 in (13) and (14), the result follows immedi-
ately. ¥
With exogenous input prices, there are two opposing forces governing
t h ec h o i c eo fl o c a t i o n . F r o mt h ev i e w p o i n to fﬁrm i, by moving closer
to its competitor the marginal consumer is, ceteris paribus,p u s h e di n
the same direction, implying that the ﬁrm will gain a larger share of the
m a r k e t .T h i si st h emarket share eﬀect, which is a centripetal force in
the model. The downside of moving closer to its competitor, though, is
that price competition between the ﬁrms becomes more intense. Conse-
quently, the competition eﬀect is a centrifugal force in the model.
Lemma 1, which is a replication of the result in Lambertini (1994,
1997) and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), shows the strength of the cen-
trifugal force, with the ﬁr m sc h o o s i n gt ol o c a t eo u t s i d et h em a r k e t .I n
the context of our model, exogenous input prices would correspond to
t h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h ed o w n s t r e a mﬁrms have all the bargaining strength,
and could be interpreted as the ﬁrms buying inputs from a competitive
upstream market, or being vertically integrated with their respective
input suppliers.
3 Location choice with input price bargaining
When input prices are endogenous, the downstream ﬁr m sm u s tt a k ei n t o
account how the outcome of input price bargaining is aﬀected by the
ﬁrms’ locations. In order to analyse the eﬀect of input price bargaining
on locational incentives, we start by considering the special case in which
both ﬁrms bargain with equally strong input suppliers, i.e. α1 = α2.
83.1 Symmetric bargaining power
When input suppliers have identical bargaining strength, input prices
will be identical in equilibrium, and equilibrium locations must neces-
sarily be symmetric. The eﬀect of input prices on the distance between
ﬁrms in symmetric locations can be found from (10) and (11).
Lemma 2 In symmetric locations, equilibrium input prices are in-
creasing in the distance between ﬁrms.
Proof. Setting α1 = α2 = α and x2 =1− x1 in (10) and (11), we
ﬁnd that ∂w1
∂x1 = ∂w2
∂x1 = − 6tα
2−α < 0. ¥
Thus, when ﬁrms are located closer together, they are able to obtain
lower input prices in bargaining. This is a very intuitive result. Closer
location implies a more ﬁerce competition on output prices between the
downstream ﬁrms, and thus there are less proﬁts for the input suppliers
to extract through bargaining. In addition, tougher competition between
the downstream ﬁrms implies that input suppliers also compete more
ﬁercely, implying that the upstream ﬁrms will be more reluctant to push
for high input prices, since total sales are more responsive to input price
diﬀerentials when price competition between downstream ﬁr m si ss t r o n g .
It would seem that Lemma 2 points to a centripetal force that should
make the ﬁrms locate closer together, and thereby achieving lower pro-
duction costs. As the following proposition shows, though, this is not
the case.
Proposition 1 The presence of input suppliers with positive (and equal)
bargaining strength implies that the downstream ﬁrms will (i) choose to
locate even further away from the market and (ii) earn more proﬁts,
compared with the case of exogenous input prices.




(2−α)2 < 0 and ∂x2
∂α = 3
(2−α)2 > 0. Inserting the equilibrium values of x,
w and p into the proﬁt functions (2) yields πi =
3(4−α2)t
4(2−α)2 , i =1 ,2.I ti s




The intuition behind this apparently counter-intuitive result is traced
by examining how input price changes aﬀect the intensity of price com-
petition between downstream ﬁrms. Relocation of a ﬁrm in the direction
of its competitor is a way to reduce own production costs, but it also con-
tributes to reduce the production costs of its rival ﬁrm. Since prices are
strategic complements, price competition between downstream ﬁrms is
intensiﬁed. Thus, the competition eﬀect from closer location is stronger
when input prices are endogenous, and this more than oﬀsets the gain
9from lower production costs. This means that, by relocating in oppo-
site directions, the increase in output prices, due to relaxed competition
between the downstream ﬁrms, is larger than the increase in input prices.
The latter fact implies that proﬁts in the downstream market are
higher when the ﬁrms are faced with bargaining over input prices. Thus,
downstream ﬁrms would actually prefer having biletaral monopoly rela-
tions with independent input suppliers, rather than facing a competitive
upstream market or being vertically integrated with their respective in-
put suppliers. The reason is that the bargaining process serves as a
credible device for softening price competition in the downstream mar-
ket, yielding a higher total proﬁti nt h em a r k e t .
3.2 Asymmetric bargaining power
The previous subsection showed that input price bargaining introduces
two opposing forces on relocation incentives for downstream ﬁrms. Relo-
cation by ﬁrm i in the direction of ﬁrm j leads to a reduction in produc-
tion costs for ﬁrm i, which implies both a direct cost saving and, ceteris
paribus, an improved competitive position towards ﬁrm j.B u t s u c h a
relocation also leads to reduced production costs for ﬁrm j, which results
in a more ﬁerce price competition. With equally strong input suppliers
we showed that this second eﬀect dominates, and relocation towards the
centre of the market is ultimately negative, in terms of proﬁts, for both
ﬁrms.
The relative strength of the two eﬀects, though, is determined by
input price responses to relocation, which in turn is determined by the
relative bargaining strength of the input suppliers. The marginal eﬀects
of changes in relative bargaining strengths on relocation incentives are
summarised in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 An increase in the relative bargaining strength of input
supplier i (input supplier j) will give ﬁrm i an incentive to relocate
towards (away from) ﬁrm j.




2(2−α1)2 > 0, ∂x1
∂α2 = − 9
2(2−α1)2 < 0, ∂x2
∂α2 = − 3




Input suppliers would optimally want to respond to relocations by
adjusting their prices to maximise proﬁts at all times. The extent to
which they are able to do so is determined by their relative bargain-
ing strengths. It is thus clear that input price responses to relocations
are increasing with the relative bargaining strengths of upstream ﬁrms.
From the viewpoint of ﬁrm i, a strong response by its own input supplier
10and a weak response by the input supplier of ﬁrm j means that ﬁrm i
can improve its competitive position by relocating in the direction of its
rival ﬁrm. For ﬁrm j, the incentives are opposite.
The important implication of these incentive mechanisms is that bar-
gaining with a strong input supplier is a strategic advantage for down-
stream ﬁrms in the location game. To make this point more clear, con-
sider the limit case in which only one of the downstream ﬁrms, say ﬁrm
1 ,h a st oe n t e ri n t ob a r g a i nw i t ha nu p s t r e a mﬁrm. This would corre-
spond to the case of α2 =0 .3 Consider now the relocation incentives
of ﬁrm 1. By moving closer to ﬁrm 2 it can reduce its production costs
without reducing the production costs of ﬁrm 2, thus unambiguously
improving its competitive position relative to its competitor. Firm 2,
on the other hand, has exact opposite incentives. Remember that the
input price of ﬁrm 1 is negatively related to the degree of competition
between the downstream ﬁrms. Thus, ﬁrm 2 can induce an increase in
the production costs of ﬁrm 1 by moving further away. We then have
the following results:
Proposition 2 Input suppliers with unequal relative bargaining strengths
implies that (i) ﬁrm i will locate closer to (further away from) the mar-
ket centre than ﬁrm j if αi > (<)αj, and (ii) the distance between ﬁrms
is increasing in αi and αj.
Proof. (i) Let A ≡ 1
2 − x1 and B ≡ x2 − 1
2 be measures of the
”distance from the market” for ﬁrms 1 and 2, respectively. Without loss
of generality, assume that α1 > α2.F r o m ( 1 5 ) a n d ( 1 6 ) w e ﬁnd that
A − B =
6(α2−α1)
(2−α1)(2−α2) < 0.








The ﬁrst part of the proposition, which follows naturally from Lemma
3, demonstrates the strategic advantage of meeting a strong upstream
ﬁrm in bargaining. Although the ﬁrm facing the stronger input supplier
will have higher production costs, the locational incentives are such that
this ﬁrm will locate closer to the market than its competitor, allowing
the ﬁrm to charge a higher price for its ﬁnal product.
Inserting the equilibrium values of x, w and p into the proﬁt func-
tions, (2), we ﬁnd equilibrium proﬁts in the full game to be




(2 − α1)(2− α2)
(17)
3Alternatively, this situation could be interpreted as ﬁrm 2 being vertically inte-
grated with its input supplier, implying an input price equal to marginal production
costs, i.e. w2 =0 .I tc a ne a s i l yb ev e r i ﬁed that this would yield the same result.
11Thus, it turns out that the strategic advantage of having the stronger
input supplier always exactly oﬀsets the cost disadvantage.
Regarding the distance between the ﬁrms’ equilibrium locations, we
know from Lemma 3 that an increase in the relative bargaining power of
one of the input suppliers provides the corresponding downstream ﬁrm
with an incentive to relocate towards its rival. Ceteris paribus,t h i sl e a d s
to a smaller distance between the ﬁrms. However, we also know from
Lemma 3 that the optimal response of the rival ﬁrm is to relocate further
away, in order to credibly soften price competition through higher input
prices. The second part of Proposition 2 shows that that this second
eﬀect is always stronger, implying that the distance between the ﬁrm is
increasing in the relative bargaining strength of either input supplier.
Comparing with the benchmark (Lemma 1), the strategic implica-
tions in the location game of input suppliers with unequal relative bar-
gaining strength are given in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Compared with the case of exogenous input prices, (i)
ﬁrm i locates closer to the market centre if αi > 0 and αj =0 ,o ri ft h e
diﬀerence between αi and αj is suﬃciently large, and (ii) the distance
between the ﬁrms is always larger with endogenous input prices.
Proof. (i) Firm 1 locates closer to the market than in the benchmark
case (see Lemma 1) if x1 > −1




(ii) Let C ≡ x2 −x1 be a measure of the distance between the ﬁrms.






.W e s e e t h a t
C (α1,α2) ≥ C (0,0).
The ﬁrst part of the proposition illustrates the signiﬁcance of the
strategic advantage of facing the stronger input supplier. The down-
stream ﬁrm negotiating input prices with the stronger supplier may, in
fact, locate closer to the market centre than in the case of ﬁxed input
prices. If the diﬀerence in relative bargaining strengths is suﬃciently
high, the ﬁrm with the stronger input supplier will choose to locate in-
side the market. In the extreme case of α1 =1and α2 =0 ,4 equilibrium
locations are given by
¡
x1 = 1
2,x 2 = 7
2
¢
. This resembles the outcome of
sequential location in Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), where the ﬁrst-mover
locates at the market centre and the follower locates outside the mar-
ket. In the subsequent section we will reconsider the case of sequential
location in the light of the present model.
4In the context of labour input, this would correspond to a situation in which ﬁrm
1 is unionised (with a monopoly union), whereas ﬁrm 2 is non-unionised.
12The second part of the proposition follows necessarily from Propo-
sition 2, and conﬁrms that bilateral monopoly relations with upstream
suppliers still serves as a device to dampen the degree of competition in
the downstream market, even in the asymmetric case.
4S e q u e n t i a l l o c a t i o n
In some markets it may be more realistic to assume that ﬁrms enter
the market sequentially, while bargaining and price competition remain
simultaneous. In this particular extension of the model the game is
now played in four stages. Firm 1 enters the market ﬁrst, followed by
the locational choice of ﬁrm 2 in the second stage of the game. In the
third stage input prices are simultaneous determined through bargaining,
whereas output prices are set in the ﬁnal stage of the game.
As before, the natural benchmark for comparison is the case of exoge-
nous input prices. From Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) we know that in this
case there is a strong ﬁrst-mover advantage, yielding
¡
x1 = 1





Equilibrium locations when ﬁrms enter sequentially are derived by
backwards induction, starting at stage 2 of the game. The ﬁrst order

















yielding a best-reply function
x2 = R(x1)
At the ﬁrst stage of the game ﬁrm 1 enters the market, anticipating the
response of the follower. Thus, the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal









An important message from the analysis of the previous section, with
simultaneous location choice, is that having the stronger input supplier
is a strategic advantage in the location game. When location choices are
made sequentially, we would thus expect that endogenous input prices
and asymmetric bargaining strengths will either mitigate or reinforce
the ﬁrst-mover advantage, depending on which downstream ﬁrm has the
stronger input supplier.
Using the proﬁt functions and the equilibrium expressions for input
and output prices derived in the previous section, the solution to (18)
and (19) enables the following statement:
13Proposition 4 When ﬁrms enter the market sequentially, ﬁrm 1 being
the ﬁrst entrant, then
(i) ﬁrm 1 locates at the market centre if α1 ≥ α2,
(ii) ﬁrm 1 locates away from the market centre if α1 < α2,
(iii) the ﬁrms always locate further apart than if production costs are
exogenous.
Proof. (i)-(ii) Observe ﬁr s tt h a tb o t hﬁrms occupying positions at
the same side of the market centre cannot be an equilibrium in the
location game when consumers are symmetrically distributed. If x∗
2 is
the best response to x1 = 1
2 − ∆, then, due to symmetry, 1 − x∗
2 must
be the best response to x1 = 1
2 + ∆. It follows that πi
¡
1







2 + ∆,1 − x∗
2
¢
for i =1 ,2. Thus, it suﬃces to consider locations
where x1 ≤ 1
2 ≤ x2.S o l v i n g( 1 8 ) ,w eﬁnd ﬁrm 2’s best response in the




(8 + x1 (2 − α1)+2 α1)
2 − α1
(20)
Inserting (20) into the proﬁtf u n c t i o no fﬁrm 1 and taking the partial












t(20 + 2x1 (2 − α2)(2− α1)+8 α2 − 4α1 − 7α2α1)
Evaluating for x1 ≤ 1
2 ≤ R(x1), a closer inspection of (21) reveals that
∂π1/∂x1 > 0 if α1 > α2.I fα1 ≤ α2,t h e n∂π1/∂x1 =0for x1 ≤ 1
2 (with
∂π1/∂x1 =0for x1 = 1
2 if α1 = α2).





2(2−α1)(2−α2) if α1 < α2
1







2(2−α2)(2−α1) if α1 < α2
6+α1
2(2−α1) if α1 ≥ α2
(23)
Now deﬁne D ≡ xF
2 −xF
1 as the distance between the ﬁr m sa te q u i l i b r i u m
locations. From (22) and (23) we ﬁnd that D = 4−α1α2
(2−α2)(2−α1) if α1 < α2
and D = 2+α1
2−α1 if α1 ≥ α2.C l e a r l y ,D(α1,α2) >D(0,0).
14Proposition 4 illustrates that when downstream ﬁrms are locked into
bilateral monopoly relations with upstream input suppliers, the location
choice of the ﬁrst entrant is potentially very diﬀerent from the case of
exogenous production costs considered by Tabuchi and Thisse (1995).
If α1 < α2,t h eﬁrst-mover advantage is mitigated by the strategic dis-
advantage of bargaining with a weak input supplier, causing the ﬁrst
entrant to locate to away from the market centre, with the follower
locating closer to the market, making equilibrium locations more sym-
metric around the market centre. In the extreme case of α1 =0and
α2 =1 ,t h ef o l l o w e rw i l la c t u a l l yl o c a t ec l o s e rt ot h em a r k e tc e n t r et h a n
the ﬁrst entrant, with equilibrium locations given by
¡
xF




In the opposite case, in which the ﬁrst-mover also has the strategic
advantage of bargaining with the stronger input supplier, the ﬁrst en-
trant clearly can do no better than locating at the market centre, but the
ﬁrst-mover advantage is now reinforced in the sense that the follower will
locate even further away from the market, compared to the case of ex-
ogenous production costs. The intuition follows straightforwardly from
the analysis of the previous section.
5 Welfare implications
Having considered the role of input suppliers on the relocational in-
centives of downstream ﬁrms in diﬀerent market structures, a natural
question arises: What are the welfare implications?
Measuring welfare as an unweighted sum of producers’ surplus (prof-







wili + CS (24)
where
















With this speciﬁcation of welfare, an increase in input prices is a
monetary transfer from downstream to upstream ﬁrms, and with unit
demand and non-binding reservation price, an increase in output prices is
similarly just a monetary transfer from consumers to downstream ﬁrms.
This implies that welfare is only determined by total transportation
costs. Thus, (24) reduces to











is total transportation costs.
Thus, maximising social welfare is equivalent to minimising con-
sumers’ transportation costs.5 In this case we know, as demonstrated by
Hotelling (1929), that socially desirable locations require both ﬁrms to
occupy symmetrical positions at the quartiles of the market, i.e. x1 = 1
4
and x2 = 3
4. This means that neither agglomeration in the market centre
(’minimal’ diﬀerentiation) nor locations at the market borders (’maxi-
mal’ diﬀerentiation) are socially desirable. Clearly, when ﬁrms locate
outside the market, as in the unconstrained version of the Hotelling
model, this implies an even larger social loss in terms of increased trans-
portation costs. Examination of transportation costs in equilibrium lo-
cations yields the following results:
Proposition 5 (i) Welfare is always lower with input price bargaining,
compared with the case of exogenous input prices.
(ii) When relative bargaining power is suﬃciently asymmetric in
favour of input supplier j,a ni n c r e a s ei ni n p u ts u p p l i e ri’s relative bar-
gaining strength raises welfare.
























4+1 3 α1 − 11α2 − 2α2α1
(2 − α1)
3 (2 − α2)




5Clearly, the assumption of unit demand has some rather strong implications for
the analysis of social welfare, making total transportation costs the only relevant
variable. It should be said that although this assumption may be a useful approx-
imation for some markets, we would normally expect the ’standard’ eﬃciency loss
from pricing above marginal costs to prevail. In this sense, the present welfare analyis
is somewhat ’partial’, and consequently the results should be interpreted with the
necessary degree of care.
16and if α2 > α1,t h e n
∂TC(α1,α2)
∂α1
< (≥)0 if α2 > (≤)
4+1 3 α1
11 + 2α1
Downstream ﬁrms purchasing inputs through bilateral monopoly re-
lations with suppliers is detrimental to social welfare compared with a
situation where inputs are acquired from a competitive upstream market,
independent of whether bargaining power is distributed symmetrically or
not. The reason is that input price bargaining induces the ﬁrms to locate
further apart than in the case of exogenous production costs, leading to
higher transportation cost for the consumers. In the case of symmetric
bargaining strengths this is straightforward, since locations necessarily
then are symmetric around the marginal consumer.
In the asymmetric case, it is not that straightforward because the ﬁrm
facing the stronger input supplier locates closer to the market, possibly
even closer than in the case of exogenous production costs. Although
the distance between the ﬁrms is larger in equilibrium (see Proposition
3) this should not automatically lead to higher total transportation costs
if the most centrally placed ﬁrm serves the majority of consumers. This
is, however, not the case. Inserting equilibrium locations and prices into
(3), it is easily conﬁrmed that the marginal consumer is always located
a tt h em a r k e tc e n t r e . I nt h ec a s eo fa s y m m e t r i cr e l a t i v eb a r g a i n i n g
strength, the downstream ﬁrm facing the stronger input supplier exploits
this strategic advantage by charging a relatively high price for the ﬁnal
product, always forcing half of the consumer mass to ’travel’ to the more
distantly located ﬁrm, which charges a lower price.
Let us now consider the case in which ﬁrms enter the market sequen-
tially. Using exogenous (and identical) production costs as a benchmark,
we know from Proposition 4 that the presence of input suppliers changes
the results in two diﬀerent respects. Due to the eﬀects discussed in sec-
tion 3, the downstream ﬁrms will always locate further apart. Ceteris
paribus, this leads to an increase in total transportation costs. How-
ever, if α1 < α2, so that the ﬁrst-mover advantage is partly mitigated
by the strategic disadvantage of bargaining with the weaker input sup-
plier, equilibrium locations will be more symmetric around the market
centre. This eﬀect should contribute to reducing transportation costs.
Thus, whether or not the presence of input suppliers is welfare improving
depends on the relative magnitudes of the two eﬀects.
Proposition 6 Suppose that location choices are made sequentially, ﬁrm











F(α 1, α 2) < TC
F(0,0)
Figure 1: Welfare implications with sequential entry.
ues for which social welfare is higher, compared to the case of exogenous
production costs.
Proof. If α1 ≥ α2 we know from Proposition 4 that the ﬁrst entrant
locates at the market centre, and xF
2 (α1,α2) >x F
2 (0,0). Obviously,
this implies that TCF (α1,α2) >TC F (0,0).I fα1 < α2, we use (22) and
(23), along with equilibrium prices derived in section 2, to calculate
TC











This expression is plotted in Figure 1, for α1 ∈ [0,1] and α2 ∈ [0,1].
Clearly, TCF (α1,α2) − TCF (0,0) < 0 in the South-West region of the
ﬁgure.
From Figure 1 we see that the presence of input suppliers increases
total welfare if both α1 and α2 are small, and asymmetric in favour of α2.
This is very intuitive. When both input suppliers are weak, the centrifu-
gal eﬀect of input price bargaining, which is detrimental to social welfare,
is quite small. If additionally the follower has the strategic advantage of
bargaining with the stronger input supplier, the ﬁrst-mover advantage is
partly mitigated, yielding more symmetric equilibrium locations. When
t h ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e nt h eﬁrms is not too large, this second eﬀect will
dominate, causing social welfare to increase.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper has been to consider how bilateral monopoly
relations between upstream and downstream ﬁrms aﬀect the choice of lo-
cation (or product diﬀerentiation) in the downstream market. The basic
18model is that of Hotelling with unit demand, uniformly distributed con-
sumers and quadratic transportation costs. Firms choose location on the
real line (not restricted to the market) and face endogenous production
costs due to the presence of independent input suppliers. We derive the
subgame perfect equilibrium location outcomes of the following three-
stage game: (i) downstream ﬁrms choose location, (ii) input suppliers
b a r g a i nw i t hd o w n s t r e a mﬁrms on input prices, (iii) downstream ﬁrms
set prices.
The analysis provides the following main results. Firstly, input sup-
pliers induce the downstream ﬁrms to locate further apart compared
to the case of exogenous production costs. Due to prices being strategic
complements, input price bargaining reinforces the centrifugal reduction-
of-competition eﬀect, causing ﬁrms to locate further apart. A strategic
advantage emerges when the ﬁrms face input suppliers with diﬀerent bar-
gaining strengths. In fact, for a suﬃcient degree of asymmetry, the ﬁrm
facing the stronger input supplier has an incentive to relocate towards
its rival, while the rival has the opposite incentive.
Secondly, considering sequential location the presence of input sup-
pliers potentially changes the results compared to the case of exogenous
production cost. In the case of asymmetric bargaining strengths, if the
follower has the strategic advantage of facing the stronger input supplier,
this eﬀect mitigates the ﬁrst mover advantage. In the opposite case, the
ﬁrst-mover advantage is reinforced.
Using the interpretation of input suppliers as trade unions, the model
oﬀers some hitherto unnoticed arguments concerning the welfare assess-
ment of trade unionism. According to conventional wisdom, trade unions
create an eﬃciency loss by pushing up wages, causing a contraction of
employment. Although this eﬀect is not present in our model, due to
the speciﬁc features of unit demand and non-binding reservation price,
we are able to identify an additional, and very diﬀerent, ineﬃciency that
could potentially arise in unionised industries. In the context of loca-
tional choice, the presence of trade unions creates incentives for ﬁrms to
relocate further away from the market centre, reinforcing the reduction-
of-competition eﬀect that causes too much diﬀerentiation in the ﬁrst
place.
Finally, it should be noted that in order to facilitate analytical tractabil-
ity when extending the Hotelling model to incorporate bargaining on
input prices, assumptions regarding demand for the ﬁnal product have
been made as simple as possible, with uniform distribution of consumers,
unit demand and non-binding reservation prices. With only two down-
stream ﬁr m st h i si m p l i e st h a tt h ec e n t r i p e t a lf o r c e si nt h em o d e la r ev e r y
strong, perhaps unrealistically strong. As mentioned in the Introduction,
19there are several ways to incorporate stronger centrifugal forces in the
model. For instance, by making demand more elastic one would get lo-
cations closer to the market centre. However, our purpose has been to
illustrate how the presence of input suppliers aﬀects downstream ﬁrms’
incentives to relocate, compared to the case of exogenous input prices,
and these (partial) eﬀects should be robust to a number of modiﬁcations
to the original model.
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